National Security Strategy 2010 says that the United States must have "a deliberate and inclusive interagency process, so that we achieve integration of our efforts to implement and monitor operations, policies, and strategies". 1 There are many different names for partnering, but they all have a consistency throughout that requires a cohesive and cooperative plan that can pull together the capabilities that exist throughout the whole of government without duplicating effort. In the last 6 years 2 , interest in partnering efforts by the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS) , and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have accelerated as a means of avoiding conflict and addressing post conflict resolution. These agencies address the common interests that we share with our partners and allies when conducting partnership activities. The above list is not all-inclusive of the agencies of the United States Government; however they are the lead agencies for national security and foreign policy and are often the conduit through which other government agencies interact at the international level. It is on these lead agencies that this paper will focus.
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The United States Grand Strategy, defined by Paul Miller as "building democratic peace, defending the American homeland, maintaining a favorable balance of power, punishing rogue actors, and investing in good governance/allied capabilities abroad" 3 , is increasingly implemented through dialogue and interaction across the interagency and to the international community. United States Government Agencies, whether tied to diplomacy, defense, or development are each building capabilities in partnership that take advantage of each agency's unique knowledge and skills.
Compartmentalization leads to a redundancy of programs and processes with no method for consistently leveraging the partnering abilities of other agencies. Currently there is no national plan to address this as identified by the National Security Strategy
2010:
…work remains to foster coordination across departments and agencies. Key steps include more effectively ensuring alignment of resources with our national security strategy, adapting the education and training of national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and programs that strengthen coordination. 4 This remaining work must also include solidifying interaction at the interagency and international level in a way that will avoid processes being derailed by a lack of consensus, resources or leadership. There is no unifying doctrine, documentation, or historical repository for partnering efforts, whether we are building nations or building wells in the Sahara. As recently as 2010, the United States Navy's Strategy for the 21 st Century identified that "interagency and multinational coordination lacks a formal process framework and supporting architecture. Naval forces must therefore be 3 capable of collaboratively planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations through innovative application..." 5 This lack of direction is what causes the interagency to re-invent partnering capabilities with each effort while the skills developed in one circumstance are not transferred to the next.
International partnering efforts touch every aspect of national power and yet there is no formalized leveraging of the current skills and capabilities throughout the government and across the environment. Without a concrete means of coordinating at the interagency level, efforts that are undefined will not be quantifiable, hence not repeatable. This paper will explore how the DoD, DoS and USAID conduct partnering activities, historical trends in partnering and a solution for the future that can combine agency successes for the benefit of all.
The current partnership environment provides a wealth of United States
Government Interagency examples, however, the plan is to provide, not an exhaustive list, but rather to highlight areas where strategic level partnership efforts are successful and/or where they are too narrowly focused. The challenges of unity of effort are not insurmountable: post 9/11 US civil authorities have improved their interaction across state and federal agencies, and internationally, NATO is partnering with 28 member nations for everything from humanitarian assistance to post conflict resolution. While neither of the aforementioned has been easy, they are successful.
The DoD has a structure of partnership that is extensive, and rightly so as members of the military find themselves increasingly involved across all of the national elements of power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME importance to the defense of our country and that they are no longer on the periphery of defense, but have now become center stage over the last 6 years. 7 The DoD is on the cutting edge of partnering and there have been valuable lessons learned at the tactical and operational levels during the last 11 years of war. These lessons in partner and nation building cross all elements of national power and cannot afford to be lost. This is reinforced in the National Defense Strategy 2008:
Our efforts require a unified approach to both planning and implementing policy… military success alone is insufficient to achieve victory. We must not forget our hard-learned lessons or allow the important soft power capabilities developed because of them to atrophy or even disappear. Beyond security, essential ingredients of long-term success include economic development, institution building, and the rule of law, as well as promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications…The Department of Defense has taken on many of these burdens. Our forces have stepped up to the task of long-term reconstruction, development and governance. The U.S. Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these capabilities. 8 This is further illuminated in Dr. Boone Bartholomees article on Land power, as he believes that in the current unpredictable terrain it is doubtful that the military will be confined to strictly military operations. 9 He points out that the Defense Science Board Geographic Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) are the senior Department of Defense representatives in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs). CCDRs receive strategic direction from the President and Secretary of Defense through a variety of formal and informal methods (to be covered in TSC-04) and are responsible for planning and executing operations to achieve US strategic ends. To effectively shape his AOR, a CCDR must accurately understand his environment and problems he faces or will face, then fashion an adaptable strategy that meets current challenges while preparing for future -and yet unknown -threats, challenges, and opportunities. This strategy must be flexible enough to prevent threats and challenges from arising when possible, defeat threats when necessary, and take advantage of opportunities that might be "hidden" within the larger dynamic strategic environment. 13 GCCs, more than any time in the past, are required to interact in their region across all elements of national power. As in all DoD agencies, the GCC's priority focus is security, but this stolid definition becomes more difficult when the economic and humanitarian well-being of a country are direct coefficients for developing Theater Security Cooperation plans.
While typically successful in their interagency endeavors, the GCC's don't always use resources designated for interagency cooperation in the same way. The creation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) illuminates this issue. The JIACGs were created to provide "a full-time, multifunctional advisory element of the combatant commander's staff that facilitates information sharing throughout the interagency community." 14 In her article "Where are the JIACGs today?" Jan Schwarzenberg details how each GCC follows a different path for the JIACGs from using them as a robust 7 capability to virtual non-existence, depending on the approach of the individual combatant commanders. 15 By letting each GCC develop its own interagency resource, capabilities can end up being event or personality driven vice doctrinally driven.
While the GCCs interaction with the JIACGs is not uniformly successful, objectives". 16 The ANG believes that the value in these partnerships lies in the "Ability to focus a part of the Department of Defense-a state's National Guard-with a single country or region in support of U.S. and partner country objectives". 17 With 65 partnerships spanning over 20 years, the National Guard's vision has been put into action successfully across the globe.
The ANG's partnership pays dividends not only at the strategic level, but also at the operational/tactical levels. Army Staff Sgt. Jim Greenhill, in a 2010 article, reported:
When the Central European nation of Hungary -which, after 17 years partnered with the Ohio National Guard…chose to deploy on a NATO mission to Afghanistan, leaders had a request: Deploy us with our Ohio National Guard partners. For almost two years, Hungarian-led Operational Mentor and Liaison
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Teams have rotated through Afghanistan, and each unit has been 50 percent Hungarian, 50 percent Ohioan. 18 Truly an example for international and interagency cooperation, the National Guard fused their unique capabilities with interagency strategic requirements to build a concrete method for global success.
The DoS is the primary agency for diplomacy, but they become involved in other national elements of power such as economic and informational. "As the lead U.S.
foreign affairs agency, the U.S. DoS has over 265 diplomatic locations around the world, including embassies, consulates, and missions to international organizations". The mandate of the U.S. Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to lead U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts is marked by an inability to field a viable civilian response capable of managing in the absence of the military leadership or of leading an integrated civil-military team. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) outlines reforms to close this capacity gap. Even if implemented, QDDR reforms are unlikely to be sufficient to address the root problems of bureaucratic rivalries and strained resources…DOS and USAID must take calculated steps to address the underlying bureaucratic, corporate cultural, and structural considerations by clarifying roles and responsibilities, clearly defining the mandate, articulating a strategic framework for developing and applying capacity, and demonstrating that capacity…Building a robust DOS and USAID capacity for stabilization and reconstruction ultimately will enhance both efficiency and effectiveness, as the skills required largely reside in the civilian arms of foreign affairs 23 The agency cultural clashes that occur between the DoS and USAID are similar in nature to the inter-service rivalry that occurs in the DoD. Improving interagency fusion and interaction cannot occur unless rivalries are put aside and the common mission becomes paramount to all.
Based on guidance from the QDDR, in 2011 the DoS developed a new Integrated Country Strategy. The new strategy takes into account all previous efforts at the mission level and combines it with new ways to plan for future diplomatic and development requirements. This combined planning with DoS and USAID creates one "strategy that encapsulates U.S. government policy priorities, objectives, and the means by which diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and other tools will be used to achieve them." 24 The Integrated Country Strategy is a plan to develop a single strategy that the QDDR defines as comprised of "two main components-a diplomatic strategy and foreign assistance strategy". 25 This is a sensible plan, as is the goal to update each mission vision and strategy every three years, however, DoD is included only on the The 3D concept and the 3D Planning Guide cover the wide areas of interest of DoD, DoS and USAID, however, it does not give a concrete way ahead to ensure interagency cooperation. Due to the nature of the guide, it can only be a recommended way ahead, which may or may not be used by the individuals it applies to. This makes it difficult to solidify gains made by the planning team.
Our current environment provides examples where interagency partnerships are successful; however, there has been little success in creating a concrete interagency partnership plan. While it appears that we are now fairly successful when it comes to partnering, these lessons are learned again in the present, instead of learning from the same efforts made in the past. These historic lessons must be heeded as we get ready to enter semi-post conflict so that we do not disregard them again. Nathan Finney points out this danger in his article on "Modern American Foreign Policy", "Observers and commentators on modern American foreign policy have consistently identified that collaboration between the elements of national power appear to be punctuated by years of uncoordinated programs and internecine fighting." 35 We must open our eyes to the value of the past in partnering.
The United States became a global leader, both militarily and economically, in Countless tomes on the histories of different conflicts have been written, yet rarely is there a paragraph on skills for partnering both nationally and internationally.
We learn how to interact over and over, only to lose momentum in peacetime and postconflict environments when the United States begins leaning toward its isolationist past.
Focus must be placed not only on learning the right lessons from history, but also how to modify those lessons for a different culture or geopolitical location.
So what is the solution to a lack of interagency partnership? First, we have to acknowledge that we cannot continue to lose the lessons of history. More importantly we cannot afford to lose the lessons of the last 11 years as we move forward. Paul
Miller identifed that we are heading toward losing the skills of partnership before they can be institutionalized
The reversal of two decades' worth of investment and grinding experience in stability operations is an unfortunate risk that ignores the realities of the contemporary security environment. Weak and failing states, and the rogue actors who operate within them, represent a real threat to regional -and even global -stability. Cutting back on stability operations now will mean throwing away hard-fought gains, and expose the United States to new risks from across the globalising, fragile world. Interagency Commands (JIACOMs). The idea is to create a civilian led multiagency command that has full authority across the elements of national power (DIME). 53 Even the authors sound skeptical of this concept reaching fruition.
The Joint Interagency concept is too big and it would remove the interagency checks and balances needed to refresh dialogue. When the solution removes the 20 interagency and merges it into one, there is the risk of having the military and diplomatic parts of DIME agreeing due to proximity if nothing else.
Mr. Dawn Watts makes a similar recommendation in his paper "How We Can
Win the Long War: A New Interagency Approach to the GWOT". He believes that "the DOD should be tasked to be the regional synchronizer by converting the current regional GCCs into Geographic Interagency Commands (GIC) that incorporate all the interagency players in a regional organization with one boss and one coordinated mission." 54 This too is a huge change that requires decisions made at the national strategic level without any guarantee of improving the interagency process.
There are other examples, but the common theme is that each solution seems bigger than the last with many requiring yet another layer of bureaucracy or a concept that is an idea without any source of testing the solution before we expend resources and effort. It is necessary to take a step back, identify interagency success and build upon it, not destroy what has been accomplished and have a new solution emerge like a phoenix from the ashes. The Interagency needs to follow the "just do it" mantra of Nike instead of the "lets talk about it" approach on which we currently spend too much time.
The United States needs a fusion of successful efforts within the interagency and a way to coordinate them with minimal additional resourcing. If these efforts can be leveraged with buy in from all, then disruption is minimized and a successful coordination center is provided that can leverage capabilities by coordinating partnering efforts. The solution lies in an Office of International Partnering (OIP).
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Global partnership allows for the strengthening of ties between the United States and other nations and developing an OIP will enable the creation of a strategy that encompasses DoD, DoS and USAID. Creating and implementing a United States
International Partnering strategy through OIP will not only address the main interests of the United States on a country by country basis, but will also help us to align our interests with other nations through the 3D process, giving all members of the interagency one-stop shopping for developing plans and strategies.
The OIP will create a common language of partnering while applying the best historically successful efforts to the current operating environment.
The conceptual idea for OIP is to have an organization that provides coordination Initially OIP will reside within the DoD as this is the optimal way to achieve the desired end state, since DoD is more heavily resourced and has a robust planning and organizational development capability. DoD may not be the final location of OIP but that will be determined during implementation.
DoD sponsorship through DSCA would leverage the current interactions in both the diplomatic and developmental pillars of 3D as well as the current defense process.
This will enable the OIP implementation team to use existing lines of communication within the interagency. Of course, knowledge of diplomacy and development is not the same as having a capability, so it is imperative that OIP be a joint interagency office that is inclusive of DoS and USAID as joint partners in the effort. The goal is not for the military to get into the business of diplomacy, or DoS to get into the business of security.
There must be a middle ground that takes into account the strengths and weaknesses of each organization, much in the same way that each branch of the military brings their own expertise to the table in the Joint Strategic environment.
Having the DoD shouldering the resourcing aspect of planning and implementation would make DSCA sponsorship a more acceptable prospect to the other agencies, provided they received an equitable balance in decision making. Initial sponsorship by DSCA would require a modification that allowed for interagency cooperation, with individuals assigned to the office on a rotational basis. The command structure would be dual hatted with the Commander and Deputy Commander positions rotating between DoD and DoS.
The OIP strategy combines DoD resources with interagency knowledge which enables all assets to be used efficiently while reducing redundancy. The main risks associated with the OIP strategy are having the 3D's reside under DSCA even temporarily. This could give the appearance that all partnering efforts are military actions. Additionally, this option may appear to create an interagency group that usurps the tasks of the embassy and the diplomatic corps. These risks can be mitigated by identifying which agency has the lead in each effort and how they present themselves.
OIP will leverage technology and training to provide the best information and personnel for interagency efforts. Emphasis on personal interaction is imperative, as dialogue is the glue that will make this effort successful. The goal is not to create something totally different, but to take small steps toward using the skills and successes that already exist in a new way. NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) and Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) are two successful commands from which to model OIP. They demonstrate successful cross agency dual command structure and international dual command structure. These units are examples of how to achieve 24 buy-in without a heavy initial cost outlay. Both began as small organizations with symbiotic relationships within existing command structures.
The OIP will use a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) type of organization during implementation. A MOU organization will be most suitable as it is "a contract used to set forth the basic principles and guidelines under which the parties will work together to accomplish their goals". 55 An MOU will include the funding and personnel agreed upon by the agencies. This is ideal for an implementation team as its inherent flexibility will allow for further development of resourcing, force structure, and strategic planning. Follow on, if vetted successfully through Initial operational capability (IOC) to
Full operational capability (FOC), will potentially be an independent agency funded and manned through DoD, DoS and USAID, with DoD continuing as the framework agency.
Beginning on a small scale, with approximately 20-25 individuals in the implementation team, the OIP will be able to develop capabilities quickly. The
Commander of DSCA will initially be the Commander of OIP and will be dual hatted.
The Deputy Commander will be an ES- Funding during this time of fiscal constraints will be difficult; however with such a small implementation team, costs would be minimal and focused on travel, initial outfitting and finding a home for the OIP. Ideally, funding will come through DSCA but be managed at the OIP and require an initial outlay of no more than $500,000 in the first fiscal year of implementation. 56 This amount is approximately 25% of the DSCA budget so it cannot be taken out of existing resources, but rather will be funded by DoD via
Other Contingency Operation (OCO) request until the OIP can be established under program of record requirements.
The organization will be physically located in DSCA until another facility within the Washington DC area can be identified by the implementation team. There are many locations that would be suitable and available to meet the needs of the small footprint of OIP.
Development of a training and education program will be conceptual during implementation. The effort will center on identifying current available training and 26 education programs and how they can be used by the unit. It is doubtful that given the current training and education opportunities that an organically developed unit training center would be necessary.
The above described concept of development for the OIP is not a pre-determined solution, but a way ahead that takes into consideration the constraints of the current fiscal environment balanced against the needs for unity of effort. As we enter the post conflict environment, the United States cannot afford to lose the skills in partnering that have been attained over the last 11 years.
In conclusion, the National Security Strategy of 2008 stated that, "We as a nation must strengthen not only our military capabilities, but also reinvigorate other important elements of national power and develop the capability to integrate, tailor, and apply these tools as needed." 57 The OIP will do this without creating dramatic and overarching bureaucratic change that is too inherently risky for the current global environment. By providing a template for a small organization that can grow and develop as information is analyzed, risks can be mitigated as they occur.
Partner activities can and will have a significant impact on national security, and the application of soft power through partnering can assist in furthering the interests of the United States as a whole. Getting to the cultural roots of a country or region will bring a better understanding of their diplomatic, developmental and defense interests so that the United States can leverage that knowledge to coincide with our own interests.
The OIP will meet peace-time and post-war partnership coordination needs and enable the U.S. Government to develop concise strategic information tailored to each
